NEW DELHI: The British government is coming out with a report next month that is expected to detail key shifts in defence, foreign affairs and development policy. More interesting, the review is likely to outline a refreshed approach to India as the UK plots its return to “east of Suez”.
East of Suez refers to the bases the UK had in West Asia and Southeast Asia. These were given up in 1968 as Britain was unable to sustain them. Now with Brexit, London is signaling renewed interest in Asia and in the economic opportunities it can pursue free of the European Union (which it formally leaves in January 2021). Closely tied to this is Britain’s renewed interest in the Indo-Pacific.
It opened a new naval base in Bahrain in the Gulf of Oman last year that can accommodate the 65,000-ton aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth. Also last year, it commissioned a joint military training base in Oman, near the Arabian Sea port of Duqm. In the central Indian Ocean is the atoll of Diego Garcia, 500-km south of the Maldives, which Britain has had since 1965. It is home to around 4000 British and US military personnel. Also, under consideration are plans for a new military base in either Singapore or Brunei. This would comfortably mesh with the nearly 50 years old Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) that brings together the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia in a security framework.
A report in Columbia University’s Journal of International Affairs of Feb 2019 titled The Empire Strikes Back: Post Brexit Britain’s Return to East of Suez argues that “The UK’s increasingly assertive role in the Middle East and Southeast Asia constitutes military deployment and defense cooperation. Britain already has an active military presence in the Gulf, playing an indispensable role in the Iraq war and in the campaign against the ISIS.”
The article argues that “At a time when Washington’s leadership is in doubt, Britain’s east of Suez strategy is welcomed by its allies in the region who worry about the implications of an increasingly assertive China and an expansive Iran. Britain’s return to the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia is complementary to the US Indo-Pacific strategy and helps ease Washington’s burden.”
It explains the Royal Navy’s freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea; last October’s naval and air drill with its FPDA partners; and the Saif Sareena III naval drill also last October in Oman, the biggest in nearly two decades. Impressive from any Indo-Pacific standpoint although there are questions about sustainability and the UK’s military capacities.
The India Angle
In a few weeks from now, India and the UK will sign a defence logistics pact, similar to what India has with a clutch of other countries including the US, France and Japan. It would offer India access to the UK’s key ports and airbases, not only in the wider reaches of the Indo-Pacific, but in the Atlantic Ocean as well.
Avinash Paliwal of the School of Oriental & African Studies says that “such logistics pacts ensure that London is not left behind in a global coalition that is emerging against China in the Indo-Pacific with India as a critical component of the same. The negative economic impact of the pandemic, Brexit and Covid-related political turmoil, and the UK’s limited military capacities in the IOR limit what London can achieve east of Suez. But its signing of such pacts signal London’s intent of ensuring its strategic relevance, despite capacity limitations and a divorce from the EU.”
There are some other deliverables in the works. Building on the defence memorandum signed in April last year, the UK government is believed to be working on a government-to-government framework for arms transfers while UK defence industries are reportedly keen to ‘Make In India’ to build on scale and reduce cost of products. The most significant sign of increased India-British naval cooperation is the posting of a British liaison officer at India’s Fusion Centre in Gurugram.
New Delhi’s geographical location and its naval capacities that are rated far superior to other countries in the region, plus its proximity to the Gulf, have drawn London’s interest. The UK is hugely dependent on Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait for funding, investment and arms sales. Once the defence logistics pact is inked, apart from the maritime support it offers, there is the view that London may be viewing its ties with New Delhi and Islamabad differently. Paliwal suggests that the defence logistics pact could increase New Delhi’s “geo-political value in London” while UK-Pakistan ties could get “restricted to diaspora and counter-terrorism issues.” Such an arrangement he feels could lead to a “tilting of scales” by London on “Kashmir and other bilateral India-Pakistan disputes.’
The other bonus from the defence logistics pact is the scope it gives India in the IOR region and beyond. India has an increased opportunity to cooperate with friendly nations who share the same strategic vision. Increased joint exercises and logistics support could be in the offing possibly at strategic points such as the Gulf region, and the Straits of Malacca among others.
Former foreign secretary Ranjan Mathai makes another point. “In the Gulf, in Africa, Mauritius and Seychelles it would not be surprising to see a naval presence once again throughout the region. India could participate in visits to the South China Sea and Southern Indian Ocean. The UK is likely to take a greater interest in affairs in the region. Note their interest in the Maldives which has rejoined the Commonwealth. This increased interest in the IOR may not be limited to increased military presence but a strong geo-economic presence where India could be the UK’s most valued partner.”
The increasing role that India is taking up in the IOR will not go unnoticed by Beijing and a pushback is possible. Abhijit Singh, head of the Maritime Policy Initiative at ORF believes that rather than overt aggression China is more than likely to respond in a calibrated manner. “Beijing will look to leverage its Belt and Road initiative in South Asia, to expand its military footprint in the Eastern Indian Ocean. Even as it keeps a watchful eye on the Indian navy, Beijing’s moves in the IOR could well be incremental. It may also look to enhance its presence amongst nations in the Bay of Bengal in ways that may be hard for India to respond to militarily.”
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