Home Premium China-Taliban Relations: What Each Side Hopes To Achieve Going Forward

China-Taliban Relations: What Each Side Hopes To Achieve Going Forward

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As the Taliban completed two years of rule in Afghanistan, the world witnessed experts cautiously divided on the issue of Western sanctions against them. Some called for cessation of critical development aid, many argued against a dialogue with the new rulers, albeit on humanitarian support. This has dipped the Afghan economy even further, as efforts to revive an already collapsed banking system fails to gather even minimal support from international financial institutions or donor countries. Since the fall of Kabul, Afghans are experiencing one of the worst humanitarian crises in history, with more than half of the population under extreme poverty.

But the Taliban’s two years brings some hope, at least for Beijing. With the new Chinese Ambassador in Kabul, Zhao Sheng, presenting his credentials to acting Prime Minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund recently, China became the first country to formally appoint a new ambassador after the Taliban’s takeover, sparking a debate on Beijing’s official recognition of the new rulers (still unclear), with many still interpreting its decision.

With an unconventional move, according to some, what is Beijing’s endgame? With a permanent diplomatic envoy in Kabul, does it aim to achieve political inclusivity, perhaps unify ethnic factions (express commitment to Afghans through greater financial investments) and politically legitimise the new rulers? Does Beijing aim to stabilise the Xinjiang region by closely monitoring the Taliban’s commitment?

Regionally, Beijing nominating its ambassador in Kabul echoes a rush to bolster ties with the new rulers. Does it aim to expand investment opportunities in the region? Perhaps strengthen its monopoly on rare earth minerals and re-initiate people-centric ties by developing critical infrastructure? A permanent diplomatic presence will enable Beijing to engage with the Taliban leadership directly while monitoring political developments in real time and engage in economic activities without reluctance.

Strengthening Strategic Alliance

By nominating a diplomatic representative to the Taliban, Beijing aims to bolster its relationship even beyond 2014 when it established limited engagement with an intent to counter the ISKP. It also indicates Beijing’s willingness to move on from its earlier interpretation of Taliban’s first rule (1996-2001), reflected majorly from the Uyghur insurgency in Xinjiang (it refrained from making any formal engagement) then. Beijing may also portray itself as a negotiator for peace (a stance it aims to bolster, since developing relations in 2014 with the then Taliban leadership while maintaining a strategic balance by supporting the erstwhile Islamic Republic). With this decision, Beijing may aim to harness diplomatic ties, investment opportunities and development initiatives, all at once, a unique opportunity, without a contender or a contest, sheer presence threatening regional strategic space.

Although Beijing has conducted numerous studies on Afghanistan’s natural resources, for at least 25 years, a diplomatic nomination will enable it to monitor Taliban’s true political might. It could evaluate the group’s ability to counter Islamist factions, particularly those that threaten Beijing’s national security. It may seek the Taliban’s assistance to counter the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) factions/affiliates operating in the region, under the pretext of Chinese War on Terror, cracking down on affiliate factions sympathetic to Uyghur militants. Perhaps an early prediction, it still remains unclear whether the Taliban will heed Beijing’s call for a kinetic action against the TIP, especially with sympathisers within its ranks. With Beijing upholding its commitment to national security, the author predicts an early disagreement with the Taliban, if the latter fails to take stringent action against Islamists entering China through Badakhshan. In the context of regional security, Beijing may keep a close watch on the ISKP’s growth in the region, evaluating Taliban’s efficient response against the group. It remains unclear if Beijing would propose/seek to host its military advisors in the coming months. The opportunity to train Taliban forces is lucrative, but remains a contest among Turkey, Qatar and Russia. Since 2014, despite having differences in ideology, the fall of Kabul has brought Beijing and Taliban closer than ever. By nominating a diplomatic representative in Afghanistan, Beijing aims to secure its presence in Afghanistan by countering:

  • Terror factions
  • Separatists
  • Religious fundamentalists/Islamist factions

That said, Sino-Taliban alliance may reflect a two-pronged approach:

  • Economic security
  • National security

It remains unclear whether Beijing has formally recognised the Taliban government from its decision to nominate a diplomatic representative, but making a conjunction between its repetitive emphasis on local Afghans’ ability to choose their own rulers with a fully functional embassy, certainly points that way. With means and mechanism to exercise influence over the Taliban leadership and prioritise economic/national security perspectives, will China’s Afghan policy reflect its five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence? Taking note of Afghanistan’s complex ethnic demography, will China respect the nation’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, without engaging in acts of aggression/its propagation, or interfere in Afghan society for political objectives, and destabilise the region?

 

Emphasis On Economic Security

 

Beijing’s economic aspirations are not just limited to Afghanistan, or its aim to enter into Central Asian economies. With Afghanistan at the crossroads (between East Asia, Middle East & Europe) it hopes to maintain geo-economic influence. Afghanistan lacks vital infrastructure to support BRI, which it may heavily invest in for greater access to markets in the Middle East & Europe. That said, it is eyeing greater economic growth, which would utilise critical energy sources, perhaps forcing it to raise domestic prices with increase in demand. Afghanistan’s market may offer new opportunities to explore. This is reflected in the recent agreement signed between Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC) and the Taliban government, giving the former the rights to extract oil from the Amu Darya basin. By exercising greater influence on the Taliban leadership, it may prevent any competition/contest over resources in the region, securing sole rights/perhaps brokering deals with one-sided advantage.

In the long run, Afghanistan may become Beijing’s hub for infrastructure and investment, expanding its expertise on communication technology and soft infrastructure in Central Asian markets, extending BRI by connecting Central Asian economies with the Middle East & Europe. That said, according to a former Taliban commander, members within the Rahbari Shura are consciously aware of Beijing’s debt-driven economic policy and monitored the Sri Lankan economic crisis in great detail. Their projects in Africa have resulted in lesser prospects (than projected) to the host nations, a fact the Taliban is aware of. Beijing’s tendency to deploy Chinese workforce as witnessed in Africa, Pakistan and Sri Lanka may not receive the same support in Afghanistan. The Taliban will promote local workforce and access to local markets, household-run businesses, with the intent to strengthen trust among the local population. Under any circumstances Taliban will prevent Afghanistan from following Sri Lanka’s experience. Any reluctance shown by the Taliban leadership could restrain Beijing from making large investments unlike Africa.

Despite this, Beijing and the Taliban may push for agreements and discuss the progress of the ones already signed. The Taliban is hopeful of greater Chinese economic investment in the region. With Beijing’s formal presence, Taliban may hope for Chinese greater assistance, whereas minerals in particular may attract greater interest from Chinese private entities. With the world transiting towards a green economy, Chinese monopolisation on processing of rare earth in Afghanistan could further strengthen its existing supply chain. According to a former official from the erstwhile Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, Afghanistan’s unexcavated mineral reserves are worth $2-5 trillion.

Besides eyeing lithium reserves, Beijing may also excavate mines of iron ore and copper. With the Taliban lacking the technical know-how and China an expert in excavating mines and minerals, the former may expand its relationship to suit Beijing’s demands. In April 2023, a Chinese mining company made a whopping proposal of $10 billion but the Taliban continued to weigh their options and preferred more takers before signing the deal. It remains unclear whether the Taliban will invite more players in the near future, creating a contest over natural resources. Learning from previous experiences, Beijing may seek guarantees before promising financial and technical assistance, ensuring Taliban’s support to Chinese strategic objectives in Afghanistan & Central Asia.

Emphasis On National Security

Beijing may closely monitor the Taliban’s commitment to countering Uyghurs operating in the region, perhaps seeking custody of those supporting the independence movement in Xinjiang, from Afghan soil. Beijing may keep a track of those Uyghurs, fighting alongside Daesh in Iraq and Syria since 2011, hoping to return. A possible cooperation between Taliban’s GDI & Beijing’s MSS cannot be ruled out.

Since 2014, Sino-Taliban relations have rested majorly on eliminating the ISKP. To counter this menace, Beijing may propose greater partnership between Tajikistan and Pakistan. This could be complicated by TTP attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan followed by threats to its investment in the region, and Islamabad’s continued support to certain Islamist factions. Beijing may exert pressure on Pakistan through the Taliban, perhaps negotiate arrangements between the two disgruntled neighbours. Beijing’s interference could alienate hardliners within the Taliban leadership, particularly on the issue of engaging with Pakistan. It could pave the way for a moderate Taliban leadership to defuse the issue, thereby preventing any rifts within the movement.

Beijing may seek the Taliban’s assurances against actions undertaken by the TIP, TTP, and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), from targeting its investment sites or its nationals in Pakistan. Taliban may seek technical assistance in countering the ISKP but it remains unclear whether it will commit to curtail TIP and TTP fighters with whom they have fought together for over two decades, with many factions sharing similar ideology.

According to a scholar affiliated to the Modern War Institute, TTP attacks against the Pakistani state have risen over 300% with a quarter targeting Chinese investment sites. The BLA has taken a lead in targeting Chinese nationals, with the focus on destroying Chinese built port-infrastructure at Gwadar. Beijing may engage with Taliban with utmost caution: exerting little to no pressure could result in damage to its interests, greater pressure could result in hardliners defecting to ISKP, TIP or ETIM. Taliban is desperate for legitimacy and in dire need of international aid but not at the cost of instability within its ranks.

Beijing may closely monitor Taliban’s ability to counter the ISKP, with one estimate claiming increased Daesh activity in the region since the Taliban’s takeover in 2021. ISKP challenges Taliban’s legitimacy in the region, undermining its ability to defend itself and its leadership, questioning its legitimacy as a net security provider for the Afghan masses. With the Taliban increasing outposts along the Pakistan border, Beijing may provide technical assistance in terms of surveillance to monitor ISKP movements along border areas.

In the context of international cooperation, Beijing may employ additional technical resources in its Super Observation Station in Tajikistan, while increasing Chinese presence in its Forward Operating Base on Tajikistan’s southeastern border, overlooking the Wakhan corridor. This decision may involve greater cooperation with Tajikistan and Pakistan, with an intent to monitor movements across the rugged terrain of the Wakhan.

Predicting Uncertainties

The author predicts three possible scenarios that could potentially overshadow Sino-Taliban relations (albeit for the first few years) post-Beijing’s nomination of a permanent diplomatic presence in the region.

Human Insecurity Overshadowing Chinese Investments

With Afghanistan currently gripped by acute human insecurity, acute poverty and famine, the social structure of living continues to collapse, forcing local Afghans to migrate in larger numbers to Iran, Pakistan and Tajikistan. Those who choose to stay may end up in opium production to survive, smuggling goods into Iran and Pakistan. As Taliban has imposed stringent regulation on opium production, it remains unclear whether Beijing would reinforce Taliban’s opium war or make any commitment in this aspect.  

Islamist threat to Beijing may curtail its ambitious investment plan, for a few years. Taking note of current trends, the ISKP is likely to expand in the north, endangering China’s mining hopes in the provinces of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar & Balkh.

Domestic Security Through Political Inclusivity

Keeping note of China’s ambitious plan to integrate Afghanistan into the BRI, Beijing may emphasise investments on strengthening infrastructure and excavating natural resources. It may employ cloaked economic opportunities (strengthen domestic economy) making it appear Afghan-centric, and reinforce it with economic schemes to support local Afghans. It may use aforementioned initiatives to propose political inclusivity at least in governance, and is highly likely to refrain from discussions over human rights violations and women’s education.

That said, Beijing may aim to strengthen trust with the Taliban as a long-term approach, refraining from engaging in too many discussions on natural resources or excavation of mines, in the first few months. It aims to tilt the regional balance of power in its favour, gaining the Taliban’s trust before exerting influence over Central Asian economies. It remains unclear whether China will gather/rally international support (if at all) through Taliban’s engagement, but may open doors to certain African economies, if it proves to exercise influence in the region. This is simply an assumption based on Beijing’s successful cultivation of a credible partnership (with Taliban) out of economic engagement.

Chinese Engagement Creates Internal Tussle Within Taliban

Chinese engagement in terms of regional securitization may not receive appreciation within the Taliban leadership. While Taliban may appreciate/seek Chinese assistance (technical at best) to counter the presence of ISKP, it may not permit the latter to put boots on the ground. It may seek technical equipment, limited military/police advisors, and technical maintenance staff for aircraft, any additional deployment would need Taliban’s explicit approval. Beijing may propose to employ intelligence officials in advisory capacity at the GDI HQ or with provincial commanders to jointly hunt terror factions. Sources within the Taliban pointed to members of the Haqqani network voicing the need for specialised training in intelligence and counter-terrorism. The decision to train and arm Haqqani members could potentially shift the balance of power (from Mullah Baradar to Siraj Haqqani), threatening moderate political members of the Rahbari Shura.

Permitting Beijing’s instructors to train Taliban fighters is a potential risk, which could create rifts between the hardliners and moderate members of the Rahbari Shura. It is unclear whether the Taliban would jeopardise internal stability over Chinese influence or Beijing would take the risk of sidelining hopes for political inclusivity and jeopardise the fate of the nation by creating a power vacuum.

(The author is Visiting Fellow, Terrorism & Security Research, International Centre for Policing & Security, University of South Wales. Views expressed in this article are personal.)

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