NEW DELHI: For a country notoriously squeamish and selective about exporting offensive weaponry, the BrahMos missile sale to the Philippines could be a turning point for India. Until now, except for the odd Dornier aircraft, Dhruv helicopter or patrol boats supplied to littoral navies, neighbours and friends, big ticket military exports have been rare. The present government has therefore sent an important signal to the world through the BrahMos deal.
Not that it went through smoothly. The grapevine has it that it took over a year to negotiate, requiring heavy lifting at multiple ends. There were bureaucratic delays and even hesitancy in endorsing the BrahMos company though it is a government undertaking. The argument was that it would set a precedent and the private sector would demand similar treatment. Clearly, despite multiple statements at the highest political level about this government’s commitment to boosting arms exports and enlarging the role of the private sector in arms making, the hard sell has not percolated to all sections of the bureaucracy.
Important to note that the sale went through despite the history of political distance between Delhi and Manila (the former’s non alignment and the latter’s military ties with the United States). There were also reservations in Manila about going ahead with the deal with a major political transition only months away (President Duterte retires in June). Fortunately, hesitancies were overcome and the deal was done.
What next? The Philippines army is also expected to invest in the BrahMos system although when this could happen is not clear. In the interim, the hunt for other customers is on. Indonesia is seen as a probable buyer and one waits for daylight on that score.
Some reports have also mentioned Vietnam although that has been around for some time. There’s a view that the Vietnamese are not interested but will not say so directly. Why?
Jitendra Nath Misra, who was consul-general in Ho Chi Minh City, writing recently for the ORF, noted that “The Vietnamese are severely pragmatic in dealing with India and China … a distant friend (India) lacks the instruments to help Vietnam face present threats from its immediate neighbor China.”
For the record, India is building patrol boats for the Vietnamese navy and reportedly refitting two Petya class vessels for anti-submarine warfare. But BrahMos is not on the horizon. The grapevine has it that the Vietnamese had a better offer from the Russians for a similar missile called the Yakhont (don’t miss the irony, Russia is partnering India on the BrahMos).
Some Indian diplomats and academics say Vietnam’s attitude finds a broader reflection in ASEAN, the regional grouping of which Hanoi is a member.
“India has historically been part of the region; it shaped the historical culture but all of that has been Sinicized,” argues Dr James Gomez, Regional Director of the Asia Centre, a think tank in Bangkok. “To solely approach Southeast Asia with a historical and romantic view about India’s contribution (to the region) is simply that, a romantic notion. The reality on the ground is that the whole region is extremely Sinicized.”
An ASEAN-wide opinion poll last year by the Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, found 76.3 per cent of the respondents naming China as “the undisputed economic power in the region”. Of course, 61 per cent of respondents also said aligning with the U.S. was the “best option” but the gap between the two figures is a telling reminder of how important Beijing is to the economic prosperity of the region. Comparatively, the U.S. may seem a distant economic partner. Its worth is seen in its military capacities and capabilities but that could diminish as the region integrates more with China.
This has implications for India. Some say the often strident anti-China discourse in India does not help and Delhi must be subtle in its approach. Interesting also to note the Singapore poll found over 50 per cent of respondents had little to no confidence in India. On other issues India did not figure, for instance vaccine shipments all over the world did not merit any mention.
Dr Gomez says that “this is not to say India’s profile cannot be enhanced, but it has to have a more strategic view and a more regular engagement, which means it will have to put more resources into public engagement”. In his view, India’s values-based democracy can have great appeal in a region where governments range from the authoritarian to dictatorships. But this must be smartly sold and any such outreach must appeal to young people.
Last word: If India is serious about capitalizing on the BrahMos sale, it may need to revamp its cadre of defence attaches in the region. Curiously, India does not have a defence attache in Manila, that task being handled by the officer posted in Singapore. Why this is so it’s not clear but it may be worthwhile having a full time defence attache (preferably a naval officer) in the Philippines not only to handle any follow on BrahMos order. With the budget for the military at around $4 billion, the Philippines is not flush with funds, so affordability is the key. This is precisely where India can help.
India can provide the right mix of platforms and weapons for naval, air and land use. Manila can also tap into India’s extensive range of military training institutions including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. One understands that the Philippines is sending, for the first time, an army officer to attend the National Defence College in Delhi.
Finally, it’s important to note that Southeast Asia’s militaries have played dominant roles in the politics of their respective countries. This applies to Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, not to miss out Indonesia. While in some of these countries the military has taken a back seat, it still wields considerable influence. It would be worthwhile, therefore, for India to consider sending retired generals, admirals and air chief marshals as ambassadors to these countries. It may be good for business.
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