NEW DELHI: The May 2020 clashes in Galwan between the PLA and Indian forces and the subsequent clashes and face-offs along the Line of Actual Control in both the eastern and western sectors raise two important questions. What made China violate the agreements which had ensured a kind of peace along the border for almost three decades? And what are the implications of this tense impasse for India?
Diplomats and academics in India believe there is probably more than one reason for Beijing’s decision. An obvious one was the messaging. The need to put New Delhi in its place for daring to think that it’s growing strategic relationship with the United States would give it leverage against China. And conversely, telling the U.S. that trying to project India as a regional counterweight and a key player in the American ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific region would actually encourage, not deter, Beijing from showing India its place as and when necessary.
The icing on the cake (from Beijing’s view) is the other message going out to India’s neighbours, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, that regardless of the growing Indo-U.S. alliance, China was still the top dog by far in the region, and they had better learn to deal with it.
Of course, none of this was planned and executed overnight. It began sometime in 2018-19 with Beijing repeatedly calling out India, saying it had shed all pretence of non-alignment by siding with the United States of America.
All this in turn was probably sparked by the growing but mistaken belief, particularly after the economic meltdown of 2008, that America’s star was waning and hence an opportunity for China to flex its considerable economic and military muscle. And finally, Xi Jinping did this because he felt that the relative power gap between India and China had widened enough to allow Beijing to change the disputed border in its favour.
Beijing achieved its purpose to the extent that after a relative period of calm, the LAC is now hot and South Block has been forced to divert considerable resources and mind space to deal with this impasse. Suddenly, all the earlier agreements on peace and tranquillity on the border have become irrelevant, and money which could have been better spent on other things has been diverted to beef up the northern borders with more manpower and infrastructure.
But apart from rapidly shoring up its infrastructure, deploying more military assets along the LAC and strengthening the strategic relationship with the U.S. and the Quad, India’s position remains somewhat ambiguous. For instance, despite constant American pressure, it has refused to join the Freedom of Navigation moves in the South China Sea.
There are two other major factors at play. One is the significant economic co-dependency, with the percentage of value added Indian exports of Chinese origin rising from 6 per cent in 2006 to over 40 per cent in 2018, and the trade deficit (the amount by which the cost of a country’s imports exceeds the value of its exports) rising by over 45 per cent, from $69.4 billion in 2021 to $101 billion in 2022, according to figures released by the General Administration of Customs (GAC) in Beijing in January 2023.
Which is why there were howls of protest from Indian industry when New Delhi tried to stem imports from China after the Galwan clash, since it would mean a direct hit on their bottom line.
The second is the domestic political situation in both nations, which severely limits New Delhi and Beijing’s abilities to work out a compromise. While India is in election mode, and hence cannot afford to be seen as soft or compromising, China which has become increasingly authoritarian under Xi, with the country spending more on intrusive internal security than it does on military modernisation, faces the same problem.
Xi’s ambitious plans to turn China into a bona-fide superpower also means that India’s rise is seen as a direct challenge by Beijing. As a former diplomat put it: “the more India rises, the more pushback it should expect from Beijing.”
This was echoed by a young Israeli delegate at the recently concluded Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, who felt that chest-thumping over India’s presidency of the G20 and chairmanship of the SCO, and the fact that dignitaries from across the world — like US secretary of State Anthony Blinken, Australia’s foreign minister Penny Wong, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, international cricketer Kevin Pietersen—had gushed over India’s rise was counterproductive.
According to him, despite all the talk, no country was likely to come India’s help if there was a major confrontation with Beijing tomorrow. “While no doubt India is becoming an increasingly important member of the global community, we must not forget what happens when a country’s growing economic and military might starts becoming a matter of concern to those who are already at the top table,” he said.
“So it is not just China that New Delhi needs to be worried about,” he said, adding: “It would be extremely naïve for New Delhi to assume that any of these nations would back India with more than just platitudes if China were to attack India tomorrow.”
India’s refusal to sever ties with Russia, under sanctions by the west, adds another twist to this, with opposition leaders like Shashi Tharoor publicly saying that a Russia which is increasingly subservient to China is not of any use to India.
So where does that leave India?
Some Indian analysts feel that such challenges “come with the territory”. As one of them put it: “the only language China understands is strength. We braved international sanctions to become a nuclear weapons state. And China knows that this is no longer 1962.” Besides, they note, a war would set both nations back by at least a few decades, and New Delhi and Beijing are aware of this.
They also assert that the growing fault lines within China, and the resentment against the increasingly draconian and intrusive measures being taken by the Xi regime meant China would think twice about opening up another front at the time when it is already being challenged in the South China sea by the western powers.
Others prescribe a more nuanced approach, with both sides sitting down and clearly laying out their red lines, crossing which would be treated as an act of war. “This does not solve the problem but it would help both of us understand what is at stake, and manage the relationship to some extent,” argued a senior diplomat and China watcher, who also said it was imperative that India further strengthen its strategic and economic relationship with the United States.
This would not only help India access the latest military technology and equipment and thus shorten the time needed to achieve some level of parity with China, it would also give New Delhi time to strengthen its periphery to mitigate—if not check—the increasing Chinese influence there. One way to do this would be to offer some kind of economic integration of South Asia, with the Indian Rupee as the currency of choice. Bar perhaps Pakistan, which is fast turning into a vassal state of China, most other neighbours which are feeling the pinch of the Chinese debt trap, would probably jump at this opportunity, he argued.
But there is a significant section of the strategic community which is wary of American intentions and abilities, and insist that it is absolutely imperative that India does not become too dependent on just one country for its military equipment and keep its options open while ramping up its indigenous capabilities.
Which begs the billion dollar question: If push comes to shove, will New Delhi be able to sustain its ‘strategic ambiguity’ on China or will it be forced to choose sides?
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