Will the Galwan Valley clashes with China force a rethink in South Block over ties with the US and with the Quad? Should India be more discerning about who its friends and allies are? Is the Russia connection overhyped?
These questions underscore the pressures India may be up against going forward. But let’s begin with something more immediate: China-Pakistan collusion during this crisis. We in India are familiar with the compact between these two strategic partners, but the sense until now, is that Beijing is unlikely to seek Islamabad’s help during a confrontation with India.
China scholar Srikanth Kondapalli believes that the time has come to discard that view. There have been reports that a senior Pakistani general now sits as an “adviser” in China’s Central Military Commission, to act as a sounding board for China’s military and intelligence agencies working on India strategy.
“There are indications the Chinese were encouraging the Pakistanis to stir up things on their side of the border, thereby forcing a two-front situation on India,” Prof. Kondapalli told StratNews Global. “The US decision to deploy two aircraft carriers in the South China Sea forced a two-front situation on the Chinese and relieved the threat to India.”
Mohan Malik, of the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, has noted the location of two of the aircraft carriers, one near the Philippines and the other moving towards Vietnam. “In the event of a war, this carrier group would probably move to the Malacca Straits and the Bay of Bengal,” he said adding that “the US could deter the outbreak of a two-front war involving China and Pakistan on one side and India on the other by dispatching an aircraft carrier battle group to the eastern Indian Ocean.”
The carriers do not necessarily have to get into a shooting match with the Chinese, says Vice-Admiral Anil Chopra, formerly of the National Security Advisory Board. He noted that “the movement of naval forces escalates things. Whenever you move them to an area of confrontation, it serves to send a message. The Chinese will worry about what the carriers can do, not necessarily about what they will do. That’s the main point of a carrier, it injects a degree of uncertainty.”
This does suggest a closer India-US accommodation. The signs in that regard are not wanting. Reports say that India is expected to take a decision in favour of incorporating Australia into the annual Malabar naval drill presently made up of the US, India and Japan. Until now India has objected to Canberra’s inclusion out of deference to China’s sentiments. That may no longer be the case.
But does that mean India is all set to embrace the Quad (Australia, India, US, Japan)? That seems doubtful given the divergent interests of the members. For the US, the security of Taiwan is crucial given its 11th largest trading partner status and as a supplier of silicon chipsets to Silicon Valley. A Chinese takeover of Taiwan would compromise US bases in Japan and South Korea. Closely tied to the security of Taiwan is the island of Guam, a little over 2,700 km to the south-east. Guam is a major military airbase and its 80,000 residents are US citizens.
This is true for other Quad members. Japan is concerned about the security of the Senkaku islands which China claims. Australia is focussed on the Pacific Island states where China has been making major inroads.
Prof. Kondapalli believes India will be wary of the larger military implications of the Quad given the unpredictable character of the man in the White House. “Therefore, in order to limit his impulses, India may want Indonesia in the group. Recall also the Quad teleconference on the coronavirus two months ago where South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand joined in, making it Quad-Plus. Then there’s ASEAN. So India will seek to spread its eggs in a number of baskets.”
There’s another reason. Quad members like the US are showing a keen interest in Nepal and Bhutan. There’s little doubt they hope to build influence in both countries to target China. But such influence could just as easily be turned against India.
A small clarification on the Five Eyes intelligence network may be relevant here. The network comprises the US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the UK. Even close US allies Japan and South Korea are not included although they are known to “collaborate”, so the question of India being invited does not arise. India has separate and bilateral intelligence-sharing arrangements with all of them. Add to that COMCASA, one of three foundational agreements signed with the US which facilitates the use of high end secured communications equipment and exchange of intelligence.
Entry into the Five Eyes network may have larger implications for India’s relations with Russia. The network has been spying on and sharing intelligence on Russia for many years. Moscow would take a dim view of a strategic partner like India joining a group whose founding dates back to the Cold War.
Above all, India remains dependent on Russia (to the extent of about 50%) for the continued supply of spares and ammunition for weapons and equipment bought from there over many years. India cannot do anything that would jeopardise this connection. The decision to buy more MiG-29 fighters and kits for Su-30MKI jets would have pleased the Russians. They have in the past also transferred strategic technologies to India that no other country would have. Therefore, the Russian connection endures perhaps for another decade, as India’s drive to design and build its own weapons and platforms gains traction.
Important that no less than Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov denied any mediation by his country into the India-China standoff. The Russians would probably see this as an unnecessary diversion from their larger game plan: a militarized BRICS. India is unlikely to bite, also China. Russia is a diminished power, it lost the Cold War, and US sanctions have hit its economy hard. It is seen to be hanging onto the coat tails of China, dependent on Beijing’s purchases of oil and gas and of course arms, to keep its economy ticking over.
More than anything else, India needs to up its economic game. A proactive and effective foreign and defence policy is built on a strong economy, which even before the coronavirus struck, had slowed down. The Centre has given enough indications of how seriously it views the economy, pushing reforms in land, labour and capital. But India’s Achilles heel has always been implementation, that plus the vitiated political environment with state-level politicians seeking pecuniary gain in every economic activity.
That India has potential is a given, unfortunately, it has remained a mantra with the potential never being realized. The disruption caused by the coronavirus has given India another window of economic opportunity which it needs to capitalize on. Likewise, the fragmented strategic landscape gives India considerable room for maneuver but the risks are also high, of moves being misunderstood, of offending old friends and partners and of making new enemies. “Strategic communication” (as the Chinese are wont to say) is the key, that and the credibility afforded by India’s transparent democratic process. The opportunities are out there, but they need to be thought and systematically carried through.
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