TAIPEI: Hong Kong is different from cities in mainland China because it still has elections. Therefore, in the logic of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hong Kong is implementing ‘one country, two systems’. China sees Hong Kong’s current governance model as a sharp contrast to the undemocratic colonial style governance under the British Empire. But there is really not much difference between the two.
Both under London and now under Beijing, political participation is decided by the central authority. Chris Patten, the last British Governor of Hong Kong, introduced the most controversial electoral reform with a fully elected legislature in 1995, which was abandoned when China reasserted sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. Before that, for more than a century under the British, the Hong Kong Legislative Council was appointed by the colonial government, not elected.
Now, under Beijing, the newly established vetting committee actually serves as a filter, excluding all Hong Kong political elites who might have disagreed with China. They will not be allowed to stand for election to the Legislative Council, thereby ending any space for political participation.
Beijing Reorienting Hong Kong’s Ruling Strategy
Beijing’s strategy for governing Hong Kong has changed from a pivoting strategy that marks the first phrase of ‘one country, two systems’ starting in 1997 and ending in 2020, to a new binding strategy. For the first phase 1997-2020, Beijing permitted Hong Kong to retain a certain degree of autonomy. Through the pivoting strategy, Beijing allowed political participation by local individuals and social forces, no matter their political stances. They could be pro-establishment or democrats, merchants/Taipans, even social groups and media. They could join together, form alliances, confront or divide, and share resources and benefits. Beijing “played” with these Hong Kong elites and social forces, trying to maintain a power equilibrium among them, while ensuring that the Chinese central authority retained final political decision-making power.
Whether it is a pro-China establishment or a grassroots democratic politician, Beijing will try its best to cut them off so they cannot unite to confront Beijing. Before 2021, an “exquisite and well-calculated” proportional representation system for the Hong Kong Legislative Council elections allowed small parties and even individuals to win seats, so that political parties could not unite but divide easily. The pro-China establishment has divided ten different groups or factions, such as the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, the Liberal Party, the Federation of Trade Unions, the New Democratic Party, the Federation of Labor, the Professional Conference, and the Economic and Democratic Alliance, New Forum, Practical Political Roundtable, New Territories Grand Alliance, not to mention the Hong Kong pan-democrats, are even more torn apart by the electoral system.
Hong Kong’s business elites have also developed their own channels to deal directly with Beijing. In the past they had 35 seats in the Legislative Council and could vote in the Election Committee to decide the chief executive. This ensured their business interests were protected. Beijing only intervened when there was a political deadlock. This was achieved through the constitutional provision that gave the rubber stamp (the Standing Committee of the) National People’s Congress the power to interpret Hong Kong’s Basic Law. It gave Beijing the final say in Hong Kong politics, and as long as local political forces operated within the framework of ‘one country’, Beijing ensured that Hong Kong’s “high degree” of autonomy and preserved ‘two systems’.
Now, under the binding strategy, only Communist Party agents or “compradors” can take part in Hong Kong politics. Recall that during colonial times, compradors were local people who helped the authorities to govern and control. The current lot of compradors will help Beijing to govern and control. They will carry out the political tasks assigned by Beijing in exchange for position (and the power that goes with it and one presumes fortune). Compradors are “patriots” selected by Beijing (there is no specified criteria for a patriot), and their interests are intertwined. These local politicians are trusted to carry out Beijing’s instructions and implement its policies, ensuring neither autonomy nor democracy. “Obedient patriots” is a new political category to appease local elites and interest groups; as for those regarded as “disobedient and unpatriotic” by Beijing, they will be completely excluded from Hong Kong politics going forward.
‘Soft’ Purge Of Patriots
The stage of using police violence and wanton and indiscriminate arrest of political dissidents, the “hard” purge, has almost come to an end. But the ‘soft’ or less violent purge begins immediately. The soft purge aims to replace establishment politicians in Hong Kong, whom Beijing does not trust, with reliable cadres. The soft purge is expected to proceed on two tracks:
First track—reviewing candidates or finding “patriots” for election: To guarantee that only “patriots” can run, the newly introduced vetting committee will be able to exclude “unpatriotic” Hong Kong politicians. So even if there are two candidates running for the office of chief executive, both will be “patriots”. This would apply for elections to the legislative council also. Hong Kong pan-democrats and political dissidents will get no space. In addition, the legislative council has increased from the current 70 seats to 90 seats, of which only 20 seats are elected through universal suffrage. Even if the wrong candidate gets in, their limited seats will guarantee no room for manoeuvre. This vetting strategy, if it works well, may in the future be expanded to the grassroots district council elections, completely wiping out dissidence.
Tian Feilong, a researcher from the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies, a semi-official body sponsored by the State Council of China, wrote a commentary in early March 2021 in a Hong Kong local newspaper, Mingpao, arguing that the future of Hong Kong politics will not need “rubber stamps or loyal waste” but more “skilled patriots” to ensure ‘one country, two systems’ works. His words are seen as a signal that Beijing is going to screen or softly purge the pro-China establishment politicians who have no capability to implement policies laid down by the communist party.
Second track—China’s full take-over Hong Kong’s informal institutions: Chinese cadres from the mainland are being assigned to take over important functions in financial investment, trade, tourism and transportation, and propaganda for non-governmental bodies in Hong Kong. One prominent example is the appointment of Mao Chaofeng, former deputy governor of Hainan province, now chairman of the Hong Kong Bauhinia Cultural Group, responsible for propaganda. The general manager of that group is Wen Hongwu, former secretary general of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government, who will oversee the United Publishing Group, the Bauhinia Magazine, the Sil-Metropole Organization which is a film production and distribution firm, and Art-mate (a commercial agency for organising Chinese cultural activities). A higher managing body has been established with total assets of over $12 billion. The Bauhinia Group is now the territory’s top propaganda machine with all its local Hong Kong staff purged.
Through a combination of hard and soft purges, Beijing hopes that Hong Kong society and social elites would be under full control, with disloyal ones being eliminated, and important positions being assigned to mainland cadres. However, the successful governance of Hong Kong cannot be achieved solely through political and social structural restrains on the elites. The Hong Kong general public, in particularly the youth, still worries about unemployment, housing and other issues which, in fact, have been instigated by the disparity between the rich and the poor. Beijing has not yet proposed any concrete policy initiatives, and public grievances could accumulate.
It’s clear that there no longer exists a formal bottom-up channel for people to spell out their grievances. Beijing may have achieved control over Hong Kong politics, but with no proper solution to the problems of the Hong Kong public, grievances could erupt at any time, causing a new round of turmoil.
(The author is Secretary General, Taiwan Association of Central Asian Studies. Views expressed in this article are personal.)
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